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This report describes the analysis leading to modifications of a computer program
that analyzes an electronic-warfare (EW) countermeasures model. The model, original
analysis, and original computer program are discussed in Robert B. Washburn, Jr..
"Dispersion Measure of Effectiveness of Electronic Warfare Combat Systems", technical
report TR-999, ALPHATECH, Inc., Burlington, MA 01803. January" 1985. which was
prepared for Dr. Michael Melich, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.
The next section discusses the context and some of the assumptions of the model.
The third section defines the notation needed in the probabilistic analysis of the model
in Section 4. The Appendix contains information for users of the computer program,
which is implemented in MICROSOFT BASIC for the APPLE MACINTOSH computer.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a set of missile-carrying platforms preparing to attack a set of surface tar-
gets. The targets, which are stationary, are composed of some real and possibly some
decoy targets, each with an associated probability of appearing to be real. Before the
attack, a subset of the real and decoy targets are located and identified as real targets.
These perceived real targets are allocated to the various attack platforms so as to distri-
bute missiles evenly.
The plan is for all attack platforms to begin firing so that missiles begin to arrive at
the targets simultaneously. However, two problems disperse the initial firing times of
the attack platforms: location error and jamming. Consider some one attack platform.
Action begins when the attack platform, approaching the target at a fixed speed,
reaches the nominal launch range. The first problem is that the location of the target is
not known precisely, which causes a positioning error that depends on the random
actual location. The second problem is that the attack platform may be electronically
jammed, preventing it from launching immediately. Jamming begins, with a specified
probability, only at the nominal launch range. If jammed, the attack platform works to
acquire the target electronically, at some point succeeding, if by no other means than
burnthrough. Burnthrough occurs when the attack platform is so close to the target
that jamming is irrelevant. When the target is acquired, either at the nominal launch
range or after, the missiles are launched over a fixed duration.
There are possibly several types of attack platforms, each with a specified number
of platforms of that type, missiles per platform, duration of fire, missile velocity, plat-
form speed, nominal launch range, burnthrough range, probability of jamming, acquisi-
tion rate, and probability of each missile hitting a target.
Additional model properties, in the form of assumptions, are stated as needed in
the analysis of Section 4.
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3. NOTATION
The notation, summarized here both for ease of reference and as an overview of the
components of the model, follows the convention that random variables are upper case
and their realizations and other constants are lower case.
3.1. Random Variables
R: The number of real targets thought to be real by the attacker.
D: The number of decoy targets thought to be real by the attacker.
X: The number of platforms attacked. (X = R + D)
t\j. The time perturbation for the / attack platform of type »* due to target-
location error.
T] . The time delay for the j attacking platform of type t to acquire the target
after jamming.
Tfj. The time delay for the / attacking platform of type i to burnthrough.
7*
, •: The time missiles from the ; attack platform of type i begin to arrive at the
target, where t = is the planned time.
H
k
: An indicator variable equal to one if the k missile from the j attack plat-
form of type i hits a target and zero if it misses.
I[t) IF G <: An indicator random variable equal to one if F ^ t ^G and zero otherwise,
for specified random variables F and G.
Y'fAt): At time t, the random rate per minute at which missiles from the j attack
platform of type t arrive at each of the real targets when EW countermeasures
are active.
Y(t): At time t, the random rate per minute at which missiles arrive at each of the
real targets when EW countermeasures are active.
3.2. Measures, of Effectiveness
{yIS {t): -oo < t < oo}: The deterministic rate per minute at which missiles hit each
real target at time t under an ideal saturation attack, which corresponds to
EW countermeasures, as a function of time.
{E( Y[t))-. -oo < t < oo}: The expected value of F(() as a function of time.
{V( Y[t)): -oo < t < oo}: The variance of Y(t) as a function of time.
E[X~
|
R > 0): The expected value of the reciprocal of the number of identified tar-
gets, given that at least one real target is identified.
{p i; (<) : -°° < ( < °°} : The probability the j attack platform of type t is firing as a
function of time.
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a: Attenuation. The ratio of the number of missile hits per real target with EW
countermeasures to that corresponding to an ideal saturation attack. Attenua-
tion is a summary number that is a function of the first two measures of
effectiveness.
/?: Dispersion. The ratio of variances of the time of randomly selected missile hits
with and without EW countermeasures. Dispersion is a summary number cal-




: Number of real targets, (l $ n
r )
n d . Number of decoy targets, (o ^ n d )
. p
r
: Probability that a real target is thought to be real. (0 ^ p r ^ l)
p d : Probability that a decoy target is thought to be real, (o ^ p d ^ l)
d: Maximum target-location error, in nautical miles, [d > 0)
n: Number of attack platform types, (n ^ l)
3.4. Attack Platform Parameters (»' = 1,2, • • • ,n)
p.: Number of platforms of type i. (o ^ p.)
m,-: Number of missiles per platform of type t*. (o ^ mj
/•: Time for a platform of type * to fire all its missiles. (0 < /,)
v
{
: Velocity of missiles launched from platforms of type i in machs. (o < e>,)
«,.: Speed of attack platforms of type i in knots, (o <«,)
/: Nominal launch range in nautical miles, (o <: /J
b
f
: Burnthrough range in nautical miles, (o <. 6j
;',: Probability that attack platforms of type : are jammed, (o ^ / ^ l)
o,: Rate at which jammed attack platforms of type i acquire the target, in recipro-
cal minutes. (0 ^ a,)
h
t
: Probability that a missile launched from an attack platform of type t hits its
intended target, (o ^ h
t
^ l)
Be careful. The notations p
r , p d , p, and p ( (t) look similar, but have quite different
meanings.
4. THE ANALYSIS
From the model we have
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r r (0) j. ™;„/r (,) r (2hr
.-,i
= r
.j + min ( Ti,i ' Ti,i )
The entire analysis is to determine various properties of Y(t), the random missile hit rate
per identified real target. (The rate for unidentified real targets is zero.)
Let us emphasize: The point of view of the analysis is that of any one of the real
targets being attacked. This perspective sometimes differs from that of the system of
targets, especially with respect to the effectiveness of undetected real targets. From the
system point of view, undetected real targets are good. From the point of view taken in
this analysis, undetected real targets are bad, because the missile hit rate on the target
of interest, which is assumed detected, is increased.
In addition to the analysis point of view, we need to emphasize another point — the
meaning of rate. In Section 2.1, Y[t) was defined as the "random rate per minute at
which missiles arrive at each of the real targets at time f." Now having defined Y(t)
mathematically we can discuss its meaning more precisely.
The rate YfAt) for platform ;' of type * is obtained by dividing the number of mis-
sile hits by the duration of firing, /,, and the number of targets, X, for all t while the
platform is firing. Y
tJ
(t) is zero for all t outside the duration of firing. Thus, Y(t)
depends upon action at times other than only t. Therefore the definition of Y{t) has
already made an assumption about the timing of missile firings within the firing dura-
tion. The level rate implies
Assumption 1. Every time t £ \Tt) , !T- + /.] has the same likelihood of seeing a
missile from platform j of type i hit a target.
The firing protocol is not specified, but is restricted to those protocols that spread the
threat evenly over the firing duration. The analysis does not yield peaks at the begin-
ning and end of the firing duration, which would be expected with the assumption of
firing one missile every /,/(m. - 1) minutes, with the first at the very beginning of the
firing duration and the last exactly /, minutes later. Two firing protocols that are con-
sistent with the definition are to fire one missile at a time uniformly distributed over
each interval of length /,/m- and to fire m
i
missiles at times uniformly distributed over
the firing duration. These two protocols would then require the the probability of mis-
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sile i,j,k hitting a target be constant over all missiles k.
4.1. The Ideal Saturation Attack Hit Rate y,s (t)
As an absolute comparison, the analysis uses an ideal saturation attack to represent
no EW countermeasures. The ideal saturation attack is achieved by having all real tar-
gets recognized as such, having no decoys thought to be real, having no location error,
having no attackers jammed, and having every missile strike a target. That is, p r = 1,










; (*)|o./.]* < E (Pi "»•//,) ^(0[0./.
i=l
4.2. Expected Value of F(t)
Consider the expected number of missiles per minute, E(Y(t)). under the specified
parameter values describing the EW countermeasures. Condition on the number of tar-
gets, .Y, to obtain
r 4 n i








.V = PLY = : fi > 0)
The condition that R > reflects the modeling perspective that Y[t) corresponds to a
real target, so the case in which only decoys are fired upon is not considered.* Now
assume
Assumption 2. The H
t k
's are independent of T{ ; i.e., whether a missile hits or
not is independent of the time perturbations.
Assumption 3. The H
t k
,
s and I(t) are independent of X; i.e., whether a missile
hits or not and the time delays are independent of the number of target platforms
attacked.
Then
E(Y(t)) = E E
1=] ;=1
E(/(0ir ,T + /.|) EE(^,;.J
/,
V x P(X=x R > 0)
* The probability that only decoys are attacked is easy to compute under the independence assumptions
made in this analysis.
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Now assume
Assumption 4. The hit probability of the k missile launched from the j attack
platform of type i is constant for all k and for all ;.
Then
E(Y(«))- V P(TtJ < t< TtJ fi)
p m h
/,
E(X' R > 0)
Therefore, only two quantities not specified directly as parameters must be calculated:
the probability that an arbitrary attack platform of type i is firing at time t and the
expected value of the reciprocal of the number of identified targets conditional on there
being at least one real target identified. These are the topics of the next two subsec-
tions.
4.2.1. Expected Value of X Given R >
Consider the expected value first, since it is straightforward. Condition on X, the
number of targets, and R, the number of real targets identified as such.
n -*-n n
E(X~ l | R > 0) = 2 z"' V P{D = x-r | R = r) P(R = r | fl > 0)
1=1 r=l
Now assume
Assumption 5. Each real target is identified as such with equal probability.
Assumption 6. Each decoy is identified as a real target with equal probability.
Assumption 7. Each decoy and each real target is identified independently of the
others.
Then both R and D = X - R are binomial random variables and
E(X~ l \ R > 0) = V .T 1
min(i, n )
V







The denominator, which is the probability of at least one real target being attacked, is
dependent upon neither z nor r and therefore is calculated only once.
4.2.2. Probability of Firing at Time t
Now consider the other quantity necessary to calculate E(Y(t)): the probability
that an attack platform of type i is firing at time t. For an arbitrary t and ;', first reor-




-/,< r,.j ^ t)
= [(1-;,) P(W,< rgUoi














Assumption 9. 7,' is exponentially distributed with rate ar
Assumption 10. T]J is the constant « ((2) = max(0, (/, - b t ) / «,).
Assumption 11. T
{
- and 71,'. are independent; i.e., the location- error perturba-




*( («-/,-, o, (-<*/•.-, <*/•,-))
uPH^ 1 + rg-UoPirgU rg l )
+ i P(«-/ ^r (0) - r (2) < o p(t {2) <i t {1)
where <p is the function that returns the length of the the intersection of the two inter-
vals and
since t, is nonnegative by definition. The probability that burnthrough occurs before
acquisition is the complementary probability
p(j-!; ) >a-«p(-».'.?)
Since 7y • is a constant,







o\ [t-t£-fit t-tX),(-d f„ J O
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Finally we must consider the most troublesome quantity: the probability that plat-
form ;' of type i is firing at time t conditional upon jamming and that the target is
acquired before burnthrough. The difficulty is that now the convolution of T {0] and T (1)
must be considered. As usual, begin by conditioning, this time on T .





where the conditional density function of TJj is relevant, since now TyV ^ t,* . The
integrand is now easy to handle, since it is of the same form as handled by the <t> func-
tion twice earlier. Therefore,
,(0)p(t-/,^ r;;+ rjy<«)-
.(«
(*. / (2d)) /* ( («-«gJ-/„ t^ff), (-*/•„ */•,)) a, exp(-a, *£>) it
(i)
l-exp(-a, tYJ)




^ t:V). The remaining problem is evaluation of the
integral.
Because of the complicated nature of the overlap function <z>, numerical solution is
tempting. However, since the analysis must be performed for many time epochs t. and
since the analysis is to be performed interactively on a microcomputer, a closed-formed
solution is worth the effort. Another advantage is that the accuracy does not depend
upon the user's choice of plotting parameters.
Once again, the approach is to break the problem into manageable pieces. Con-
sider the nature of <f>((a,b),(c,d)), where for a moment a, 6, c, and d have no meaning
other than to define two arbitrary intervals. Two intervals have one of six possible rela-
tionships. Two are trivial one interval lying above another ~ resulting in
<p((a,b),(c,d)) = 0. The four interesting cases are a < c <b < d, a < c < d < b, c < a < b < d,
and c < a < d < b. Since the six relationships are mutually exclusive, the integral is the
sum of six other integrals (two with zero values) with replaced by the appropriate
overlapping length. As t; l
}
goes from to t;
,
different integrals become relevant. The
subprogram integrator in the appendix implements the various formulas.
4.3. Variance of Y(t)
Given p (t) and E(Y[t)) from the last section, the calculation of \{Y(t)) is straight-
forward under
Assumption 12. Each attack platform is independent of all other attack plat-




v(F(t))= 2 s v(r..,.(*))= v Pi v(Kj/)j
l-l ; = 1 i = l
where the second equality is true since all attack platforms of a single type are identi-
cally distributed by definition of type.
Now V{Y
t





Y(t)). As a subargument from Section 3.2 we have
E(K,.
;.(0)-K *,//,) PJt) E(X' l \ R>0)




Taking the square, conditioning on X, and invoking the earlier assumption that H
t
.







., r + / 1 / A
-2
i P(* = z i? > 0)
















Assumption 14. All missiles fired by attack platform j of type i are independent;
i.e., for all i and j, Hl} k is independent of H , if k ^ I.












E(X R > 0) can be calculated essentially for free when E{X R > 0) is calculated.
by substituting x~ for r~ in Section 4.2.1.
4.4. Attenuation
Attenuation, denoted by a, is a scalar measure of the effectiveness of the E\Y coun-
termeasures. The measure is one of comparison to an ideal saturation attack: every real
target is identified as such, no decoys are mistaken for real targets, no attackers are
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Graphically, a is the ratio of the areas under the two rate curves arising from the two
scenarios. While a can be calculated by numerically integrating the two rates, a closed-
form expression can be obtained by noting that each integral is the expected value of




' 1=1 ; = 1 *=1
1 = 1













n d , p r , and p d . For n > l, attenuation is also
a function of p,mr
Good EVV countermeasures have low attenuation. However, keep in mind the
point of view of the analysis — that of a real target being fired upon. If there are many
real targets, the ideal saturation attack will fire at all of them, diluting the rate for any
one real target.- Countermeasures could hide some real targets, thereby increasing the
rate for those fired upon. For this reason, attenuation can be greater than one.
4.5. Dispersion
The dispersion measure, denoted by /?, is another scalar measure of the effectiveness
of the EW countermeasures. Again it is a comparison to an ideal saturation attack, but
10
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now the criterion is the dispersion around the average time of missile hits. In particular.
00 00




2 dt- fyls (t)tdt
Good EW countermeasures have high dispersion.
A closed-form solution for would be useful, since numerical calculation is slow
and prone to error via both time truncation and interpolation.
5. APPENDIX
This appendix is a short discussion of the computer implementation of the model
and analysis discussed in the body of this report. The computer program runs interac-
tively on the APPLE MACINTOSH microcomputer. The mechanics of running the pro-
gram are straightforward if the model of Section 2 is understood. If you have not done
so. read the introduction of Section 2.
The current version is a modification of the original ALPHATECH program. The
input/output routines are essentially the same; the analysis has been mostly rewritten.
The program was tested on three MACINTOSH computers: One with MACBOTTOM,
one with HYPERDRIVE, and another with no hard disk. Because the modified program
sometimes writes directly to the printer rather than dumping the screen, some code that
works for one system won't work for another. If you have difficulty printing, try to use
the system without the hard disk; usually this can be done by booting the system with
the program disk in the machine.
The program consists of four types of screens, two for specifying model parameters
and two for displaying analysis results. The second screen is for specifying parameters
for each type of attack platform. The first screen is for specifying everything else ~~ tar-
get information, maximum target location error, number of attack-platform types and
plotting parameters. Other than the plotting parameters. Section 3.3 defines the global
parameters and Section 3.4 defines the attack-platform parameters in the order they are
to be specified on the screen.
There are two output screens. Both center on axes showing time horizontally and
hits per minute vertically. The first shows the rate at which a real target is fired upon
as a function of time, under the assumption of an ideal saturation attack. The second
begins by recreating the first output screen and adding other functions of time and two
scalar measures of effectiveness, as discussed in Sections 3.2 and 4. The two heavy lines
are the expected rate per minute of missiles hitting a real target under the two scenarios
of EW countermeasures and of an ideal saturation attack. In addition, two lighter lines
are plotted. These lines are one standard deviation above and below the EW mean rate
function. They provide an idea of the variability from the mean. Note that deviations
above the upper light line are not uncommon.
11
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The second output screen is obtained by pressing carriage return while looking at
the first output screen. The time in seconds to calculate the values for the second screen
is roughly the product of the number of time points plotted and the number of attack-
platform types. If the cursor is blinking, then the program is waiting for input; other-
wise, the long wait is due to computation.
The two scalar measures of the effectiveness of the electronic-warfare countermeas-
ures are attenuation and dispersion, discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.
Attenuation is calculated analytically and dispersion is calculated by numerical integra-
tion. The plotting parameters are important to the calculation of dispersion, in that if
the time interval considered is too short or the time between plotted points is too long,
the calculated dispersion will be incorrect. To provide the user with a warning when
the plotting parameters are inadequate, the attenuation is calculated both numerically
and analytically. If the answers differ by more than 5%, then a warning is printed.
Any of the four screens can be dumped to the printer. However, printing only the
fourth screen is usually sufficient, since it contains all the information of the third screen
and the program also prints all model parameters whenever the fourth screen is printed.
An example follows. A listing of the BASIC program is attached.
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* f»0 Edit Se<frcft Run Windows i
GLOBAL PARAMETERS
n :
r 1. NUMBER REAL TAAGETS 0=1) 4
n
d
: 2. NUMBER DECOY TARGETS (>=0) 6
P
r
: 3. PROB. REAL TARGET DETECTED (>0) .2
Pd
: 4. PROB. DECOY DETECTED AS REAL .1
d : 5. TARGET LOCATION EAAOR - NM (>0) 500
n : 6. NUMBER PLATFORM TYPES (>0) 1
7. MINIMUM PLOT TIME - MIN. -20
8. MAHIMUM PLOT TIME - MIN. 40
9. PLOT STEP SIZE - MIN. .5
Figure 1. Screen for Specifying Global Parameters
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1. NUMBER PLATFORMS (>=0) 3
m
.
1 2. NUMBER MISSILES PER PLATFORM (>=0) 5
f
l 3. TIME TO FIRE RLL MISSILES - MINOO) 3
V




5. PLATFORM SPEED - KTS (>-0) 300
1.
l 6. NOMINAL LAUNCH AANGE - NM (>=0) 200
b.
l 7.
BURNTHROUGH RRNGE - NM (>=Q) 50
j i
8. PROB. ACQUISITION RRORR JRMMED .4
a
l





10. PAOB. LAUNCHED MISSILE HITS .9
Figure 2. Screen for Specifying Attack Platform Parameters
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1 1 1 I I I
-20.0-14.0 -8.0 -2.0 4.0 10.0 16.0 22.0 28.0 34.0 40.0
TIME (MINI
Screen 3. First Outout Screen, Containing the Hit
for the Ideal-Saturation Attack
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-20.0-14.0 -8.0 -2.0 4.0 10.0 16.0 22.0 28.0 34.0 40.0
TIME (MINI
Figure 4. Second Output Screen, Containing all Analysis
Results, Plus the Printed Model Parameters.
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GLOBAL PARAMETERS
NUMBER REAL TARGETS ( >=1 ) 4
NUMBER DECOY TARGETS < >=0
)
6
PROB. REAL TARGET DETECTED <>0) .2
PROB. DECOY DETECTED AS REAL .1
TARGET LOCATION ERROR - NM O0> 500
NUMBER PLATFORM TYPES ()0) 1
MINIMUM PLOT TIME - MIN. -20
MAXIMUM PLOT TIME - MIN. 40
PLOT STEP SIZE - MIN. .5
TYPE 1 PLATFORM PARAMETERS
NUMBER PLATFORMS (>=0) 3
NUMBER MISSILES PER PLATFORM 0=0 > 5
TIME TO FIRE ALL MISSILES - MINOO) 3
MISSILE SPEED - MACH <>0) 4
PLATFORM SPEED - KTS (>=0 300
NOMINAL LAUNCH RANGE - NM <>=0 ) 200
BURNTHROUGH RANGE - NM ( >=0
)
50
PROB. ACQUISITION RADAR JAMMED .4
RATE OF ACQUISITION - 1/MIN. (>=0) .2
PROB. LAUNCHED MISSILE HITS .?
ichael Melich, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.
"iginal, January 1985, Robert Washburn, Alphatech, Inc.
Ddi-fied, March 1 996
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